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BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
18130 
A writ of review was filed by the plaintiff, J and W Jani-
torial Service, to review an order of the Industrial Commission 
holding it liable for compensation benefits as a result of the 
death of Jeffrey Matthew Tilt, which included the payment of 
statutory funeral benefits to the father of the deceased as well 
as the payment of an award to the Second Injury Fund which is 
mandated by statute in cases of death by industrial accident 
where the deceased has no dependents. 
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION 
A hearing was held September 26, 1981 before an Administra-
tive Law Judge of the Industrial Commission on the application of 
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Frank L. Tilt for benefits he claimed as a result of the death 
of his son who was alleged to be an employee of J and W Jani-
torial Service at the time of his fatal accident. On October 6, 
1981 the Industrial Commission entered an order which contained 
its findings that (a) the deceased was an employee of the plain-
tiff at the time ·of his death and was not an independent con-
tractor; (b) the deceased died in an accident which arose out 
of his employment; (c) the parents of the deceased were not 
dependent upon him within the meaning of the compensation act 
and, therefore, were entitled only to the statutory burial ex-
penses of $1,000 as provided by Utah Code Ann. (1953) Sec. 35-1-
81, as amended, and (d) the plaintiff was liable to the Second 
Injury Fund pursuant to Utah Code Ann. (1953} Sec. 35-1-68, as 
amended, for the sum of $18,720.00 as a result of the death by 
industrial accident of an employee with no dependents from which 
the Administrator of the Second Injury Fund agreed to forego 
$3,000 to be deducted and payed to the father of the deceased as 
additional reimbursement for burial expenses. 
On October 19, 1981 the plaintiff filed a motion for review 
in which it was requested that the Industrial Commission review 
the transcript of the hearing and accept memoranda from the par-
ties. On October 28, the Commission entered its order denying 
the motion for review without having requested a transcript of 
the hearing. Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the 
Commission's order November 5, 1981 on the ground that the Com-
mission had failed to review the evidence or receive memoranda 
-2-
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of law. No ruling on the motion for reconsideration was made 
within the time allowed for petitioning for review of the com-
rnission' s final order and plaintiff's petition was filed Novem-
ber 25, 1981. On April 6, 1982 two members of the Commission 
entered an order denying plaintiff's motion for reconsideration 
with Commissioner Hadley dissenting after having reviewed the 
evidence. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff respectfully requests that the order of the In-
dustrial Commission be reversed on the ground that the Commission 
erroniously concluded as a matter of law that the death of the 
deceased arose out of or irt the course of his employment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
J and W Janitorial Service is a sole proprietorship owned 
by Mr. and Mrs. Jerry Johnson. They are engaged in the business 
of contracting to provide janitorial services to the owners of 
several buildings in the Salt Lake City area. (R 35-36) At the 
time in issue here, Mr. Johnson employed three persons in addi-
tion to himself to service his janitorial accounts. (R 36) 
(These employees, including the deceased, were actually consider-
ed independent contractors by the parties themselves, (R 36-37) 
but the plaintiff has not appealed from the Commission's finding 
that the deceased was a "statutory employee" for the purposes of 
workmen's compensation as defined by Utah Code Ann. (1953) Sec. 
35-1-42, as amended, and he will be referred to as an employee 
throughout) . 
-3-
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One of the plaintiff's service contracts was with a bakery. 
Every evening at approximately 7:00 p.m., plaintiff's employees 
went to the bakery to clean large mixing and baking equipment 
and to sweep out the premises. (R 36) On the average night, 
the plaintiff's crew of three people finished cleaning the bak-
ery at about L:30 a.rn. (R 41) Among the machines they cleaned 
was a large mixer about six and a half feet high, five feet wide 
and five feet deep with a platform behind it from which bakery 
workers poured flour and other ingrediants, and upon which plain-
tiff's employees stood to sweep and hose out the tank. (R 41) 
Mr. Johnson testified that a crew of three workers which ordin-
arily included his father worked the bakery job and that, after 
having trained them, he did not regularly go on to the job site 
to supervise their work. (R 43,48) 
The deceased, Jeffrey Matthew Tilt, worked for the plaintiff 
on approximately fifteen to eighteen occasions at the bakery dur-
ing December 1980 and January, 1981 after which he quit his em-
ployment without explanation. (R 38) On the night of his death, 
May 9, 1981, one member of the plaintiff's regular crew, Mr. 
Johnson's father, was unavailable to work at the bakery. (R 44) 
One of Mr. Johnson'. s other crew member, Cary Dannenberg was a 
close friend of the deceased and asked him to fill in that night 
for Mr. Johnson's father. (R 55) 
Mr. Dannenberg, the deceased, and the third crew member, 
Trevor Hildebrand, arrived at the bakery at approximately 7: 00 p.m ..... 
that evening. (R 40) (The plaintiff preferred testimony from Mr. 
-4-
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Dannenberg at the hearing that the three brought beer with them 
when they went to work. The Administrative Law Judge sustained 
the Second Injury Fund's objection to this evidence. (R 56-59) 
The two surviving crew members testified that they finished their 
work around 2:00 a.m. (R 59,68) Mr. Hildebrand stated that they 
decided to remain on the bakery premises rather than leave as 
they usually did because they intended to spend the night out-
side the Salt Palace in a line of people waiting to buy concert 
tickets and wanted to "kill some time" at the bakery where it 
was warm. {R 46,69) 
After they finished w9rking, the deceased and Trevor 
Hildebrand began playing hide and seek around the bakery and 
playing with the fork lifts. {R 61,70) Approximately forty-five 
minutes later, {R 70) as Trevor and Cary were drinking beer, 
Trevor hit Cary in the arm causing him to drop his beer bottle 
and break it. They were cleaning up the broken glass when they 
heard the deceased yell from what appeared to be his position on 
the platform behind the la~ge mixer. He asked them to "open the 
door". Trevor reached for the button near where he was standing 
which opened the door to the bakery and, by mistake, pushed an 
adjacent switch which activated the mixer. Tragically, the de-
ceased was not on the platform but was inside the mixer at the 
time and was killed instantly. (R 60,70) 
Though the Administrative Law Judge sustained objections to 
testimony on the subject and indicated that he would not rely on 
it, the other crew members testified that the deceased had been 
-5-
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drinking beer throughout the night at work and had taken drugs. 
(R 68,69,71) 
Mr. Johnson and his two employees who witnessed the death 
stated that they had never at any time previously seen anyone 
climb down into the mixer, and had never seen anyone play 
hide and seek around the mixers or on the premises at all. (R 41, 
65,67,70) Counsel for the plaintiff attempted to examine Mr. 
Tilt about whether he had ever known beforehand that any employ-
ees had consumed beer or drugs on the bakery premises, but the 
Administrative Law Judge ruled that the question was irrelevant. 
(R 42) The plaintiff wished to proffer his testimony that he 
had never known of any employees drinking or taking drugs on the 
job, and that the one time an employee came to work under the 
influence of alcohol he was sent home. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. AN INJURY WHICH OCCURS 
AFTER WORKING HOURS IS COMPENSA-
BLE ONLY WHEN THE EMPLOYEE IS 
ENGAGING IN ACTIVITIES REASONABLY 
INCIDENT TO HIS EMPLOYMENT. 
The issue to be decided in this case is whether the de-
ceased's death was by an accident "arising out of or in the course 
of his employment" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. (1953) 
Sec. 35-1-45. Where, as in this instance, the facts and circum-
stances of the accident are established by the testimony of two 
eyewitnesses, and are uncontradicted in every essential respect, 
this court's authority on review is invoked to determine whether 
the law was correctly applied to the facts of the case. 
It is undisputed that the deceased's accident occurred after 
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he and his co-workers had completed their janitorial work. 
In evaluating whether or not an after-hours injury on the pre-
mises of employment is compensable, Professor Arthur Larson 
(hereinafter referred to as "Larson") in his treatise Workmen's 
Compensation Law states the following rule at Vol. lA, Sec. 21.60 
p. 5-36 and 5-40. 
The course of employment, for employees 
having a fixed time and place of work, 
embraces a reasonable interval before and 
after official working hours while the 
employee is on the premises enga.ged in 
preparatory or incidental acts. The rule 
is not confined to activities that are 
necessary; it is sufficient if they can 
be said to be reasonably incidental to 
the work. 
* * * 
Although a reasonable interval is allowed 
before actual working time during which 
an injury would normally be compensable, 
if the employee merely loiters around the 
work place before or after hours, the em-
ployee may be found to have been outside 
the course of his employment. 
Professor Larson's views are consistent with this court's 
recent holding in United States Steel Corp. v. Draper, 613 P.2d 
508, 509 (Utah 1980) that 
The scope of one's employment includes 
not only the specific duties assigned 
but also those things which it should 
reasonably be expected an employee would 
do in connection with those duties . . . 
The deceased in this case had a fixed place of work, the 
bakery, and fixed time for performing his work, that is, from 
7:00 p.m. when the bakery's operation was shut down until all 
the routine janitorial services were performed, ordinarily at 
-7-
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approximately 1:30 a.m. (R 41) Given the fact that his work 
had been completed for appro~imately 45 minutes (R 70), the re-
levant inquiry appears to be whether at the time he died the 
deceased was engaging in activities "reasonably incidental" to 
his work, to· use Larson's phrase, or activities "reasonably ex-
pected . · .. in connection with those duties", as this court 
has stated the rule. 
The plaintiff submits that when an employee remains on the 
premises of employment after working hours to "kill time" where 
it is warm before standing in line overnight for concert tickets, 
and where he spends that time drinking beer and playing hide and 
seek, he is engaging in activities which are not reasonably re-
lated to his duties and therefore do not arise out of or in the 
course of his employment. 
A review of cases cited by Larson, supra, Vol lA Sec. 21.60 
reveals that when an employee has remained at the workplace after 
hours to change his clothes, to put away his tools, to shower, or 
to close up the building, his activities are generally thought to 
be incidental to his employment and resultant accidents are usual-
ly compensable. On the other hand, where it is found that the ~­
ployee remained at the workplace for purely personal reasons, and, 
especially when he simply engaged in frolic for his own amusement, 
it is generally held that the course of employment does not ex-
tend beyond the normal hours of employment to encompass such ac-
tivity. In the case of Trotter v. C'ou·nty of Monmouth, 144 N.J. 
Super. 430, 365 A.2d 137 (1976) a county rnaintainence worker 
-8-
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returned to the shop after completing his assignments for the 
day but shortly before quitting time. He saw a motorcycle 
parked there which belonged to a co-worker and began riding it 
on and off county property and after the time at which other 
workers were dismissed by their foreman. Workmen's compensation 
coverage was held not to extend to his accident. 
Similarly, in the case of Sumner v. Coe, 40 Or. App. 815, 
596 P.2d 617 (Or. App. 1979) the court held that when an employee 
was injured while riding after work across the employer's park-
ing lot on the hood of a fellow worker's car,he was not engaging 
in activity reasonably related to his employment, and was out-
side the course of his employment at the time. The same result 
was reached by the California Appellate Court in Seymour v. Setzer 
Fbrest Products, 124 Ca. App. 2d 608, 268 P.2d 1084 (Cal. App. 
1954) when an employee who had come to work early was injured 
while visiting and chatting with other employees. The court 
concluded that because his reasons for being on the premises were 
personal and were not related to any service to his employer, tne 
accident which occurred was not compensable. 
The fact that the fatal accident in issue here occurred after 
normal working hours does not per se render the death outside the 
coverage of the compensation act. However, when it is undisputed 
that the activities of the deceased at the time were in no way 
reasonably incidental to the discharge of his duties, the accident, 
as a matter of law, was one which did not arise out of or in the 
course of his employment. 
-9-
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POINT II. THE ACTIVITIES OF THE 
DECEASED CONSTITUTED A SUBSTAN-
TIAL DEVIATION FROM THE COURSE 
OF HIS EMPLOYMENT. 
Professor Larson notes that even where some reasonable 
activity of an empl~yee may bring a period of time he spends 
at the workplace after his normal hours within the course of 
his employment, he may still "break the link with employment" 
by engaging in a substantial deviation from the course of his 
employment such as would render an accident during normal hours 
uncompensable, lA Larson, supra, Sec. 21.60 at p.5-41. And, 
inasmuch as the deceased was engaging in play at the time of 
his death, it is ~lso useful to analyze the facts of this case 
by application of the legal test for determining the compensa-
bility of horseplay which may be applied to injuries regardless 
of when they occur. 
In the case of Prows v. Industrial Comm'n. of Utah, 610 P.2d 
1362 (Utah 1980) this court reviewed at length the factors which 
should be considered in determining whether an injury which oc-
curs during "horseplay" arises out of or in the course of em-
ployment within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. (1953) Sec. 35-1-45. 
The court adopted Professor Larson's view that horseplay should 
be treated like other instances of deviation from the course of 
ernployrnent;if the deviation is insignificant, the accident is 
said to occur in the course of the worker's employment; if the 
deviation is substantial a resultant accident is not compensable. 
This court stated the test to be as follows: 
-10-
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Whether initiation of or participation 
in horseplay is a deviation fromrcourse 
of employment depends on (1) the extent 
and seriousness of the deviation, (2) the 
completeness of the deviation (i.e., 
whether it was commingled with the per-
formance of duty or involved an abandon-
ment of duty), (3) the extent to which 
the practice of horseplay had become an 
accepted part of the employment, and (4) 
the extent to which the nature of the 
employment may be expected to include 
some such horseplay. 
610 P.2d at 1365. 
In the Prows case, the court applied this test to the 
evidence and reversed the Commission's order denying benefits. 
The claimant was employed to deliver medical supplies and 
was injured when struck by a piece of wood shot at him with a 
rubber band. The evidence established that the deviation was 
brief in duration, occurring during a lull in work activities, 
and that it happened as the employee was otherwise properly en-
gaged in moving medical supplies. There was evidence that em-
ployees had engaged in rubber band fights with great frequency 
prior to the claiman~'s accident, and the court concluded that 
the ready accessibility of rubber bands and the nature of the 
claimant's work loading and unloading supplies made it reasonable 
to expect that horseplay of that kind would occur on the job. 
The plaintiff respectfully contends that the four part test 
of the Prows case, when applied to the facts of the case at bar, 
establishes as a matter of law that the deceased had substantial-
ly deviated from the course of his employment at the time of his 
death. 
-11-
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(1) Extent and seriousness of deviation. The first part 
of the Larson test as adopted in Prows focuses on the duration 
of time involved in the horseplay and whether the conduct it-
self was a trivial or a substantial alteration of behavior from 
that which is ordinarily incident to the performance of employ-
ment duties. The court in Prows, supra, 610 P.2d at 1366 quoted 
with approval Larson's statement that 
The substantial character of ·a horseplay 
deviation should not be judged by the 
seriousness of its consequences in the 
light of hindsight, but by the extent of 
the work-departure in itself. This is 
not always easy to do, especially when 
a trifling incident escalates or explodes 
into a major tragedy. 
This court added its observation that, 
We think the converse of this principle 
is likewise true; the fact that a major 
tragedy has occurred should not dictate 
an award of compensation when that tra-
gedy resulted from a deviation so ex-
tensive and serious that the employment 
can be said to have been abandoned. 
In contrast to the claimant in Prows who "momentarily set 
aside his duties and took up the challenge", (to engage in a rub-
ber band fight), 610 P.2d at 1366, the deceased in the case at 
bar spent three quarters of an hour running around the bakery, 
meddling with bake~y equipment, playing hide and seek, and drink-
ing beer. (R 61,70) His activities were not simply a trivial 
deviation from the normal work of a janitor but a serious depar-
ture from conduct which benefited his employer to conduct which 
was exclusively for amusement, and extreme in the risks to his 
safety which it created. The plaintiff submits that, as a matter 
-12-
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of law, the deceased's deviation from his duties at the time 
of his death was serious and extensive. 
(2) Completeness of the deviation. The second prong of 
the test concerns the extent to which the horseplay was "co-
mingled with the performance of duty." The court in Prows 
noted that at the time the rubber band fight began, the claim-
ant was engaged in ·the discharge of his duties and that, had 
he not been injured, "he would presumably have completed loading 
the truck and carried on with his deliveries." 610 P.2d at 1366. 
In contrast to the actions of the claimant in Prows, the 
deceased in this case was finished with his work at the time of 
his injury and had completely abandoned any performance of jani-
torial duties. Had he not been injured he would not have resumed 
his work, butwould have gone on to the Salt Palace to wait for 
concert tickets. There is no sense whatsoever in which it could 
be said that his hide and seek game was "co-mingled with the per-
forrnance of duty. " 
(3) Extent to which horseplay has become a part of the em-
ployrnent. The court in Prows adopted Larson's explanation of 
this factor that 
The controlling issue is whether the custom 
had in fact become a part of the employ-
ment; the employer's knowledge of it can make 
it neither more nor less a part of the em-
ployment--at most it is evidence of incorpo-
ration of the practice into the employment. 
(italics in original) 
610 P.2d at 1336-1337. 
In the case at bar, the applicant, whose burden it was to 
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establish the compensability of his son's death, introduced no 
evidence that horseplay such as occurred the night of the acci-
dent, that is, beer drinking, h~de and seek, and climbing in 
mixers, had become a customary practice. On the contrary, the 
only evidence in the record on this issue is the testimony of 
the deceased's employer and his two co-workers that no one had 
ever been seen inside a mixer, and that the employees never be-
fore played hide and seek around the bakery. As noted, the plain·,, 
tiff also attempted to introduce evidence that beer drinking had 
never before been observed on the job. (R 41,42,65,67,70) 
(4) Extent to which nature of employment may be expected to 
include some such horseplay. 
Explaining the final issue which arises under the Larson 
test, the court in Prows stated that 
This element of Larson's approach focuses 
on the foreseeability of horseplay in any 
given employment environment and on the par-
ticular act of horseplay involved. Consi-
derations which may enter into the analysis 
of this point include whether the work in-
volves lulls in employment activity or is 
essentially continuous, and the existence 
of instrumentalities which are part of the 
work environment and which are readily us-
able in horseplay situations. This list is 
not intended to be exhaustive but rather 
illustrative of the possibilities. 
610 P.2d at 1367. 
The appiicant introduced no evidence from which it could 
be found that the kind of horseplay the deceased engaged in was 
foreseeable. The deceased's job was not one which involved lulls 
such as are common for many workers who must wait for others to 
complete certain tasks, or for certain events to occur, before 
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they can continue with their duties. The janitorial duties in-
valved here were continuous, according to the testimony of the 
witnesses, requiring each worker to go about his cleaning as-
signment without necessary interruption or interrelation with 
the performance of others. (R 40) 
Though the instrumentality of injury in this case was part 
of the work of the deceased in the sense that the mixer was 
cleaned by plaintiff's employees, it was never necessary to 
climb into the mixer to clean it and both its size and the pre-
sence of an attached platform suggest that it was neither de-
signed to be entered nor easily accessible for that purpose. 
The fourth aspect of the test is the forseeability of the kind 
of horseplay which resulted in injury and, unlike the universally 
forseeable use of rubber bands as instruments of playful combat, 
the evidence in this case is that no one could reasonably have 
forseen that anyone would climb down into a mixer. 
The Industrial Commission did not articulate any legal 
theory by which it reached the conclusion that the applicant sus-
tained his burden of proof in this matter. The Commission stated 
simply as its "finding of fact" the following legal conclusion: 
In dealing with the issue of whether or not 
the deceased was killed while in the course 
and scope of his employment the contention 
by the employer that the applicant was en-
gaged in horseplay does not by itself defeat 
the applicant's claim. I have considered 
this defense and while it is a close question 
I find that the deceased, Jeffrey Tilt, was 
killed while in the course and scope of his 
employment with J & W Janitorial. 
Plaintiff respectfully submits, however, that when the law 
-1 c;_ 
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of the Prows case is applied to the undisputed facts of this 
case, the only reasonable conclusion is that the deceased was 
not acting in the course of his employment when he died. 
The plaintiff's position is further supported by the early 
Utah case of Twin Peaks Canning Co. v. Industrial Com.m'n., 57 
Utah 589, 196 Pac. 853 {1921) which also concerned the cornpensa-
bility of a death which occurred during horseplay. In that case, 
a fourteen year old boy was crushed when riding on the top of 
an elevator cage which was mistakenly activated. Though the 
court did not articulate the legal standard announced later in 
Prows, this court noted that the Twin Peaks decision was founded 
on the same general principles, Prows, supra, 610 P.2d at 1365. 
In Twin Peaks, supra, the court referred to the course of 
employment issue as a close one, but resolved it in favor of com-
pensability on the basis of evidence that, {a) the deceased and 
other children had frequently used and played on the elevator 
in question; {b) the accident occurred during a lunch break lull 
in working hours, and {c) the propensity of children of the age 
of the deceased to engage in unreasonable forms of horseplay made 
it forseeable that an injury on the elevator should occur. None 
of the factors which the court in Twin Peaks considered to be 
dispositive of the issue in favor of compensability are present 
in the case at bar. 
The plaintiff submits that the Industrial Commission misap-
plied the law when a majority of its members concluded that the 
deceased died in an accident which arose out of or in the course 
-16-
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of his employment. 
POINT III. EVIDENCE THAT THE DECEASED 
WAS DRINKING ALCOHOL AND USING DRUGS 
AT THE TIME OF HIS DEATH IS RELEVANT 
TO. THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM THAT HE HAD 
ABANDONED HIS EMPLOYMENT AT THE TIME 
OF HIS ACCIDENT. 
Plaintiff repeatedly posed questions to the co-workers of 
the deceased about his use of alcohol and drugs at the time of 
the accident. The Administrative Law Judge sustained every ob-
jection from the Administrator of the Second Injury Fund to this 
evidence though some of the answers of the witnesses to the ques-
tions propounded are part of the record. (R 42,46,56-59,68,69) 
The plaintiff respectfully submits that the Administrative 
Law Judge erred in refusing_to consider plaintiff's evidence 
that the deceased was drinking and using drugs at the time of 
his death and further contends that this evidence substantiates 
plaintiff's claim that the deceased was outside the course of 
his employment when he died. 
Professor Larson in his treatise, supra, at Vol lA Sec. 
34.00, p.6-60 states the rule that, 
Voluntary intoxication which renders an 
employee incapable of performing his work 
is a departure from the course of his em-
ployment. 
Even in states like Utah where intoxication is not a bar to a 
workmen's compensation recovery, {Utah Code Ann. (1953) Sec. 
35-1-14 provides, instead, for a reduction in benefits where an 
injured employee was intoxicated, except in cases of injury re-
sulting in death) evidence of intoxication may establish that 
-17-
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the claimant was unable to perform his employment duties at the 
time of his accident, and so had abandoned the course of his em-
ployment. Embre·e v. I':ndustrial Commission, 21 Ariz. App. 411, 
520 P.2d 324 (1974); Steffes v. 93' Leasing Co., Inc., 580 P.2d 
450 (Mont. 1978) 
In cases where it is not asserted that an injured worker 
was so intoxicated as to be totally unable to perform work re-
lated activities, evidence of drinking has been relied on by the 
Industrial Commission and by this court, along with other circum-
stances, in resolving the question whether at the time of an ac-
cident an employee whose working hours are flexible was engaged 
in work related activity or in purely social activity. Those 
cases include Martinson v. W-M rnsurance Co., 606 P.2d 256 
(Utah 1980) where this court affirmed the Industrial Commission's 
ruling that an insurance salesman's driving trip which resulted 
in injury was a social excursion and not a part of his employment, 
and Morley v. Industrial Commission, 23 Utah 2d 131, 459 P. 2d 212 
(1969) when the court affirmed the Commission's rejection of a 
construction company owner's claim that his accident after drink-
ing beer at a bar was employment related. 
Intoxication by alcohol is a defense to a claim for compen-
sation benefits, as is intoxication by drugs, when it results in 
incapacity to perform job functions. Furthermore, in any case 
where the employer claims that an injured employee was not acting 
in the course of his employment when he is injured, evidence of 
drinking or using drugs, like evidence of all the worker's activi·" 
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ties at the time of the accident is probative of the issue. 
In this case, the testimony plaintiff sought to adduce further 
substantiates the obvious inference of other evidence,that be-
fore his death the deceased had totally abandoned activities re-
lated to his job and _was engaging in conduct which was neither 
incidental nor related in any way to performance of those duties. 
CONCLUSION 
The tragedy of Jeffrey Matthew Tilt's death cannot be over-
stated. However, as this court has observed, it is not the ser-
iousness of the consequences of an employee's activities by which 
their relation to his employment is measured, but by application 
of principles of law which define the contour of the employment 
relationship. 
The death of an employee is compensable under Utah workmen's 
compensation law if it occurs as the result of the performance 
of his duties or activities reasonably related to his duties, 
United States Steel Corp. v. Draper, supra. The fact that an 
accident happens after normal working hours does not mean that 
it is outside the protection of the compensation act if a worker 
is engaged in activities reasonably incidental to his employment 
duties. The fact that an injury occurs as the result of horse-
play does not relieve an employer of liablity if the employee 
engaged in only a minor deviation from his employment. 
When the law is applied to the uncontested facts of this 
case, however, the conclusion is inescapable that Mr. Tilt's 
death did not arise out of or in the course of his employment. 
-19-
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He remained at the bakery after hours for purely personal rea-
sons and for a period of forty five minutes engaged in a form 
o~ horseplay which was completely disassociated from his duties, 
extremely hazardous and highly out of the ordinary. His use of 
drugs and alcohol is a relevant factor in assessing his legal 
status at the time of the accident and further substantiates 
the plaintiff's contention that he had abandoned his employment 
at the time of his accident. 
The plaintiff respectfully requests that the court reverse 
the decision of the Industrial Commission. 
DATED this day of May, 1982. 
---
TIMOTHY C. H PT 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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